01752    a2200301   4500001001200000003000800012005001700020007001500037008004000052020002200092040001500114041000800129100002300137245008600160260004600246300001400292500001000306520085300316540007201169650001501241650001601256650001201272650001101284650001501295650002101310776002201331856009701353OB-obp-1872FrMaCLE20251214082709.0cu ||||||m||||161128e||||||||xx |||||s|||||||||0|en|d  a978-2-8218-7610-1  aFR-FrMaCLE  aeng1 aVelleman, J. David10aFoundations for Moral Relativism :bSecond expanded edition /cJ. David Velleman.  aCambridge :bOpen Book Publishers,c2016.  axi-141 p.  aEbook  a In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism, a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, “moral black holes”. The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, Foundations for Moral Relativism presupposes no prior training in philosophy.  aCC-BY-NC-ND-4.0uhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 4aPhilosophy 4acommunities 4aculture 4ahabits 4aphilosophy 4amoral relativism  z978-1-78374-032-14 eVelleman, J. Daviduhttps://books.openedition.org/obp/1872yFoundations for Moral Relativism